Ganoob67
07-21-2008, 04:02 AM
By MARK N. KATZ (Middle East Times), Published: July 02, 2008
A May 17 Washington Post op-ed piece by Ali H. Soufan entitled, "Coddling Terrorists" decried how Yemen has let free some of al-Qaida terrorists responsible for the October 2000 bombing of the USS COLE ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) warship in the Yemeni port of Aden. In his article, Soufan (who played a key role in the FBI investigation of the bombing) declared, "If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally." Why, then, has the Yemeni government not done so, especially since al-Qaida threatens it as well as the United States?
The answer to this question requires some discussion of the complicated history of Yemen – a country that is little known not just in the West, but even in the Arab world which it is a part of.
What is now the Republic of Yemen came into being in 1990 with the unification of what was then North Yemen and South Yemen, known officially as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
South Yemen had a Marxist regime that was both pro-Soviet and anti-American. From South Yemen's independence from Britain in 1967 until unification in 1990 (and even afterward in a failed effort to re-establish South Yemeni independence in 1994), relations between North and South were highly contentious.
North Yemen, though, was not the "conservative" government that it and united Yemen are often portrayed. The Arab nationalist revolution that ousted its monarchy in 1962 brought to power a "revolutionary" government that was often anti-American.
In visits I paid to North Yemen prior to unification, I was amazed at how much hostility and resentment government officials and ordinary citizens expressed toward the United States. Yemenis were especially incensed about American support for Israel, and more importantly, for Saudi Arabia – Yemen's neighbor with which it was frequently at odds over the course of the 20th century.
Yemen's one and only president since unification – Ali Abdallah Saleh ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) – was previously president of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990.
During the Cold War, Saleh was a master at playing the United States and Saudi Arabia on the one hand off against the Soviet Union on the other. In what can only be considered a masterstroke of wiliness, he even succeeded in getting Soviet military assistance in combating a Marxist insurgency inside North Yemen that Soviet-backed Marxist South Yemen was supporting.
In the aftermath of a 1986 civil war between warring Marxist factions of the South Yemeni government and the collapse of communism a few years later, Saleh became the dominant Yemeni ****** upon unification in May 1990.
Shortly thereafter, Saleh openly supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and confrontation with the United States and its allies. This move was widely supported by the Yemeni public not so much because it was enamored of Saddam but because it strongly supported Saleh's anti-American and anti-Saudi stance.
In retrospect, of course, this move was a mistake. Saudi Arabia reacted by expelling up to 1 million Yemenis who had been working in the kingdom, leading both to an abrupt end to the remittances they had been sending home and to an unwelcome addition to the ranks of the unemployed in Yemen. The United States also sharply cut back its aid to Yemen. The U.S. *****istration of George H.W. Bush had taken pains to improve ties to Yemen before the war in Kuwait, and was especially bitter over what it regarded as the Saleh regime's betrayal.
True to form, however, Saleh managed to slowly re-ingratiate himself with the United States – the post-Cold War power that mattered most.
During the Bill Clinton ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) *****istration, Saleh convinced many in Washington that he was steering Yemen toward free elections and tolerance. This paid off in the 1994 Yemeni civil war. Although Saudi Arabia backed the South Yemeni secessionists, the Clinton *****istration and the Western allies did not. After several weeks of fighting, Saleh's forces prevailed.
By the end of the Clinton *****istration, it was increasingly clear that Saleh was not serious about democratization. Many of the freedoms that he introduced earlier were greatly reduced by then.
However, the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 and Sept. 11 gave Saleh another means for currying favor with the incoming George W. Bush ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) *****istration: the war on terror.
After initial hesitation, the Saleh regime cooperated with the FBI's investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole, convicting several of those whom the investigation found to be responsible for it.
After 9/11, Saleh went out of his way to cooperate with Washington, even allowing the United States to launch a targeted missile attack on its (as well as his) Islamist opponents in Yemen. His actions stood in stark contrast to the Saudi government's lack of cooperation with the United States in the aftermath of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings and then of 9/11.
It is in the context of this previous history that Yemen's release of terrorists, including those convicted for taking part in the bombing of the USS Cole, needs be understood.
To begin with, Saleh's close cooperation with the United States was never popular in Yemen where not just the public but government officials have long viewed the U.S. with hostility.
While happy to receive American assistance in order to keep himself in power and get rid of some of his opponents, the problem for Saleh is that the closer he is to Washington, the more like an American "agent" (as some of al-Qaida's Yemeni affiliates have accused him of being) he appears.
American criticism of Yemen (including that by Soufan) for not cooperating with the United States in the war on terror, by contrast, makes Saleh look good in the eyes of the Yemeni public.
There are also three other reasons for his changed behavior.
First, Saleh's cooperation with the Bush *****istration was strongest in the aftermath of the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq when these appeared to be successful and there was talk in Washington about possibly intervening in Yemen.
Saleh's cooperation with Washington then may well have been intended to forestall this. By contrast, with the United States now preoccupied by Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (not to mention a presidential election and a host of domestic issues), it is highly unlikely that the U.S. is going to intervene in Yemen. Thus, Saleh does not need to work nearly as hard to forestall this.
Second, while al-Qaida affiliates continue to be active in Yemen and are even targeting Yemeni government forces and installations, they are not Saleh's principal domestic opposition. More serious is the renewed demand in the former South for independence.
More serious still is the insurgency Saleh's forces have been fighting against the "Huthis" – a Shiite group in the far north of Yemen – since 2004 in a conflict that has reportedly led to thousands of casualties.
Just as in 1994 when Saleh enlisted Islamists to fight against southern secessionists, he now appears to be recruiting radical Sunnis in the fight against this Shiite group. While radical Sunnis may be America's principal opponents, they are not Saleh's – at least, not right now.
Third, Saleh appears to be more interested in forestalling Yemenis linked to al-Qaida from either attacking his regime or fomenting opposition to it now and in the future than in punishing them for past attacks on Americans. Like the Pakistani government, he appears willing to reach a modus vivendi with Sunni radicals even if this leaves them free to focus on the United States – something that, however unfortunate, the Yemeni public does not appear particularly alarmed about.
With regard to Soufan's observation that, "If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally," the fact of the matter is: Yemen is not truly an ally. Its ******, President Saleh, cooperates with the United States when he sees it in his interests to do so, but not when he doesn't.
The trick for Washington, then, is to figure out how to induce Saleh and Yemenis generally to cooperate with the United States.
As has already been seen, this is no easy task. Avoiding failure at this will require that U.S. government officials not assume Yemen is an ally, because they think it should be or even because its government says it is, but that they be well aware of the factors that need to be overcome to obtain – and retain – even limited Yemeni cooperation with the U.S. in the war on terror.
-- Mark N. Katz ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.
A May 17 Washington Post op-ed piece by Ali H. Soufan entitled, "Coddling Terrorists" decried how Yemen has let free some of al-Qaida terrorists responsible for the October 2000 bombing of the USS COLE ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) warship in the Yemeni port of Aden. In his article, Soufan (who played a key role in the FBI investigation of the bombing) declared, "If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally." Why, then, has the Yemeni government not done so, especially since al-Qaida threatens it as well as the United States?
The answer to this question requires some discussion of the complicated history of Yemen – a country that is little known not just in the West, but even in the Arab world which it is a part of.
What is now the Republic of Yemen came into being in 1990 with the unification of what was then North Yemen and South Yemen, known officially as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
South Yemen had a Marxist regime that was both pro-Soviet and anti-American. From South Yemen's independence from Britain in 1967 until unification in 1990 (and even afterward in a failed effort to re-establish South Yemeni independence in 1994), relations between North and South were highly contentious.
North Yemen, though, was not the "conservative" government that it and united Yemen are often portrayed. The Arab nationalist revolution that ousted its monarchy in 1962 brought to power a "revolutionary" government that was often anti-American.
In visits I paid to North Yemen prior to unification, I was amazed at how much hostility and resentment government officials and ordinary citizens expressed toward the United States. Yemenis were especially incensed about American support for Israel, and more importantly, for Saudi Arabia – Yemen's neighbor with which it was frequently at odds over the course of the 20th century.
Yemen's one and only president since unification – Ali Abdallah Saleh ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) – was previously president of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990.
During the Cold War, Saleh was a master at playing the United States and Saudi Arabia on the one hand off against the Soviet Union on the other. In what can only be considered a masterstroke of wiliness, he even succeeded in getting Soviet military assistance in combating a Marxist insurgency inside North Yemen that Soviet-backed Marxist South Yemen was supporting.
In the aftermath of a 1986 civil war between warring Marxist factions of the South Yemeni government and the collapse of communism a few years later, Saleh became the dominant Yemeni ****** upon unification in May 1990.
Shortly thereafter, Saleh openly supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and confrontation with the United States and its allies. This move was widely supported by the Yemeni public not so much because it was enamored of Saddam but because it strongly supported Saleh's anti-American and anti-Saudi stance.
In retrospect, of course, this move was a mistake. Saudi Arabia reacted by expelling up to 1 million Yemenis who had been working in the kingdom, leading both to an abrupt end to the remittances they had been sending home and to an unwelcome addition to the ranks of the unemployed in Yemen. The United States also sharply cut back its aid to Yemen. The U.S. *****istration of George H.W. Bush had taken pains to improve ties to Yemen before the war in Kuwait, and was especially bitter over what it regarded as the Saleh regime's betrayal.
True to form, however, Saleh managed to slowly re-ingratiate himself with the United States – the post-Cold War power that mattered most.
During the Bill Clinton ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) *****istration, Saleh convinced many in Washington that he was steering Yemen toward free elections and tolerance. This paid off in the 1994 Yemeni civil war. Although Saudi Arabia backed the South Yemeni secessionists, the Clinton *****istration and the Western allies did not. After several weeks of fighting, Saleh's forces prevailed.
By the end of the Clinton *****istration, it was increasingly clear that Saleh was not serious about democratization. Many of the freedoms that he introduced earlier were greatly reduced by then.
However, the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 and Sept. 11 gave Saleh another means for currying favor with the incoming George W. Bush ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) *****istration: the war on terror.
After initial hesitation, the Saleh regime cooperated with the FBI's investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole, convicting several of those whom the investigation found to be responsible for it.
After 9/11, Saleh went out of his way to cooperate with Washington, even allowing the United States to launch a targeted missile attack on its (as well as his) Islamist opponents in Yemen. His actions stood in stark contrast to the Saudi government's lack of cooperation with the United States in the aftermath of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings and then of 9/11.
It is in the context of this previous history that Yemen's release of terrorists, including those convicted for taking part in the bombing of the USS Cole, needs be understood.
To begin with, Saleh's close cooperation with the United States was never popular in Yemen where not just the public but government officials have long viewed the U.S. with hostility.
While happy to receive American assistance in order to keep himself in power and get rid of some of his opponents, the problem for Saleh is that the closer he is to Washington, the more like an American "agent" (as some of al-Qaida's Yemeni affiliates have accused him of being) he appears.
American criticism of Yemen (including that by Soufan) for not cooperating with the United States in the war on terror, by contrast, makes Saleh look good in the eyes of the Yemeni public.
There are also three other reasons for his changed behavior.
First, Saleh's cooperation with the Bush *****istration was strongest in the aftermath of the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq when these appeared to be successful and there was talk in Washington about possibly intervening in Yemen.
Saleh's cooperation with Washington then may well have been intended to forestall this. By contrast, with the United States now preoccupied by Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (not to mention a presidential election and a host of domestic issues), it is highly unlikely that the U.S. is going to intervene in Yemen. Thus, Saleh does not need to work nearly as hard to forestall this.
Second, while al-Qaida affiliates continue to be active in Yemen and are even targeting Yemeni government forces and installations, they are not Saleh's principal domestic opposition. More serious is the renewed demand in the former South for independence.
More serious still is the insurgency Saleh's forces have been fighting against the "Huthis" – a Shiite group in the far north of Yemen – since 2004 in a conflict that has reportedly led to thousands of casualties.
Just as in 1994 when Saleh enlisted Islamists to fight against southern secessionists, he now appears to be recruiting radical Sunnis in the fight against this Shiite group. While radical Sunnis may be America's principal opponents, they are not Saleh's – at least, not right now.
Third, Saleh appears to be more interested in forestalling Yemenis linked to al-Qaida from either attacking his regime or fomenting opposition to it now and in the future than in punishing them for past attacks on Americans. Like the Pakistani government, he appears willing to reach a modus vivendi with Sunni radicals even if this leaves them free to focus on the United States – something that, however unfortunate, the Yemeni public does not appear particularly alarmed about.
With regard to Soufan's observation that, "If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally," the fact of the matter is: Yemen is not truly an ally. Its ******, President Saleh, cooperates with the United States when he sees it in his interests to do so, but not when he doesn't.
The trick for Washington, then, is to figure out how to induce Saleh and Yemenis generally to cooperate with the United States.
As has already been seen, this is no easy task. Avoiding failure at this will require that U.S. government officials not assume Yemen is an ally, because they think it should be or even because its government says it is, but that they be well aware of the factors that need to be overcome to obtain – and retain – even limited Yemeni cooperation with the U.S. in the war on terror.
-- Mark N. Katz ([فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات]) is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.